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A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN CASES OF SUCCESSION 
I. Sources of Private International Law 
German c o n f l i c t s of law rules are c o d i f i e d i n the Intro-
ductory Law to the "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch" of 1896.^ 
The Statute gives a very incomplete picture of the 
private international law i n action. Its rules have 
been part l y susperseded by international Conventions, 
and the Statute has been supplemented and modified by 
2 
rulings of the courts and l e g a l scholars. The Treaty 
of Friendship between the U.S. and the Federal Republic 
3 
of Germany of 1954 has l i t t l e s ignificance for the 
4 
c o n f l i c t rules on succession . In cognizance of the 
sorry fact that the Introductory Law i s not only incom-
plete, but largely outmodedy discussion for i t s reform 
has been i n progress for many years. The German Council 
of private international law recently has published pro-
posals for a reform of the private international law i n 
5 
the f i e l d of succession, but for the lack of a lobby 
i n the parliament there i s l i t t l e hope of a new Statute. 
As a r e s u l t , for the purpose of ascertaining the German 
pirvate international law one has to look to court 
decisions and scholary writings rather than to the 
Introductory Law. 
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The General C o n f l i c t Rules on Succession 
1. Law of Succession (lex hereditatis) 
The p r i n c i p l e of the unity of succession has i n German 
Law resulted i n the adoption of one and the same succession 
law for movables as well as immovables. This law w i l l 
be referred to i n the following discussion as the "Law 
of the Succession" or the "lex h e r e d i t a t i s " . 
a. The National Law of the Decedent as lex hereditatis 
As a general rule derived from a r t . 24 and 25 EGBGB the 
national law of the decedent at the time of his death 
7 
governs the devolution of his property. If the 
decedent had no n a t i o n a l i t y , the law of his l a s t 
g 
habitual residence or of his l a s t residence applies. 
Problems aris e i f the decedent had two or more nation-
a l i t i e s . If a l l of them are foreign, German courts w i l l 
ask for the "most e f f e c t i v e " n a t i o n a l i t y , i . e . , the 
n a t i o n a l i t y of the state with which the decedent has 
9 
had the c l o s e s t connection. According to a modern and 
p r e v a i l i n g view, the "most e f f e c t i v e n a t i o n a l i t y " has 
to be decisive, too, even i f one of the n a t i o n a l i t i e s 
was German,^ The t r a d i t i o n a l view, however, which i s 
applied s t i l l ^ , r e jects t h i s i n favor of German as the 
deciding n a t i o n a l i t y . 
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The n a t i o n a l i t y test f a i l s f however, where there i s no 
Single System of law for the whole of the t e r r i t o r y of a 
given country. For example, the law of decedents 1 estates 
i n the U.S. i s l e f t to the various states; there has to be, 
therefore, an additional rule i n order to ascertain the 
appropriate state within the U.S. A variety of Solutions i s 
offered: Some apply the German interState p r i n c i p l e and look 
12 
to the decedent 1s l a s t habitual residence. Some look 
rather to the domicile as defined by the American law, be i t 
the domicile of the 14th amendment as interpreted by the 
13 
U.S. Federal Courts or the domicile concept of the common 
14 
law. In many decisions i t i s not clear whether the terms 
"domicile" and "residence" are to be interpreted according 
15 
to the German or the American concept. However that may 
be, uncertainty on t h i s point does not seem to give r i s e to 
any r e a l p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
b. Exceptions to the Nationality P r i n c i p l e 
1. L i a b i l i t y for Debts of the Decedent, Art. 24 
II EGBGB 
With regard to the l i a b i l i t y for the debts of the decedent 
the heirs may choose his domiciliary law instead of his 
national law (art. 24 II EGBGB). For example, the heirs of 
a German whose domicile at death was i n the State of New 
York may invoke New York law and, in case an administration 
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takes place, thereby l i m i t t h e i r l i a b i l i t y to the estate. 
A renvoi (a reference by the laws of one country back to the 
laws of another nation) of the domiciliary law w i l l be 
accepted. Art. 24 II AGBGB i s of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l s i g n i -
ficance and w i l l be eliminated i n an upcoming re v i s i o n of 
17 
the Statute. 
2. Privilegium Germanicum, Art. 25 sent. 2 EGBGB 
If the decedent had a foreign n a t i o n a l i t y but his l a s t 
domicile was i n Germany, German claimants to his estate may 
invoke the German law of succession instead of the national 
law of the decedent, unless t h i s law would submit the estate 
of a German exclusively to German law (art. 25, sent. 2 
18 
EGBGB). The purpose of t h i s outmoded provision i s " r e t a l i -
ation" against states which follow the domicile p r i n c i p l e 
rather than the p r i n c i p l e of na t i o n a l i t y i n private i n t e r -
national law. The provision i s , therefore, generally a p p l i -
cable for the determination of the succession of U.S. Citizens 
who die domiciled i n Germany. "Domicile" i n th i s context 
20 
has to be interpreted according to German law. Since 
German law accepts the remission (reference) by U.S. law to 
the domiciliary law of the decedent with regard to mov-
21 
ables, a r t . 25 sent. 2 EGBGB i s meaningless except i n 
cases where an American national died with his l a s t domicile 
i n Germany according to German law but had retained his 
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22 domicile within the U.S. according to U.S. law. 
Of the Substantive German law of succession, e s p e c i a l l y 
compulsory shares of decendents or surviving spouses, and 
23 
also inheritance rights of the i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d may be 
of importance i n the context of a r t . 25 sent. 2 EGBGB. 
3. Lex Situs, Art. 28 EGBGB 
A concession to the law of the State where parts of the 
decedent's property i s situated, i s co d i f i e d i n ar t . 28 
EGBGB: The provision states that, i f parts of the property, 
movable or immovable, are situated i n a state the law of 
which i s not to govern the succession but i n which, however, 
c e r t a i n "special provisions" for cer t a i n species of property 
e x i s t , then these "special provisions" s h a l l apply for thi s 
property. Unfortunately, the meaning of the term "special 
provisions" i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r . Obviously included are 
such provisions as govern the devolution of cer t a i n kinds of 
property, l i k e feudal rules for family property or special 
provisions for the inheritance of farms. 2 4 Doubtful are 
sp e c i a l provisions for other kinds of property i n the 
private international law of countries, where the reason for 
a d i f f e r e n t treatment i n the in t e r n a l law and consequently 
the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f have faded away. Since there are no 
special Substantive interests of these states to have th e i r 
own law applied, i t i s argued that a r t . 28 EGBGB should not 
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be interpreted to command the application of the lex situs 
25 
in such cases. The preva i l i n g view and the courts however 
extend a r t . 28 EGBGB to special c o n f l i c t s rules which have 
no counterpart i n the in t e r n a l law of the State of the 
2 6 
s i t u s . Thus, i f a German decedent leaves immovables 
situated i n the U.S., the law of the American State i n 
question w i l l govern the succession of these immovables (art, 
28 EGBGB), while German law (as the national law of the 
decedent) w i l l apply to the succession i n a l l other aspects. 
4. Renvoi, a r t . 27 EGBGB 
By f a r the most important exception to the na t i o n a l i t y 
p r i n c i p l e i s the broad admission of renvoi (reference to 
another nation's laws) i n German law (art. 27 EGBGB). The 
reference to the national law of the decedent i n a r t . 24 and 
25 EGBGB i s understood as well as a reference to the con-
f l i c t rules of that country. Hence, a remission (reference) 
or transmission (reference to the laws of a t h i r d country) 
27 
contained i n such rules w i l l be respected. The renvoi i s 
espe c i a l l y important for German-American succession cases. 
"American" law as the national law of a decedent, as i n t e r -
preted by German courts, refers to the domiciliary law for 28 29 movables or to the lex situs for immovables. If t h i s 
means a renvoi to German law (on the basis of the l a s t 
domicile of the decedent i n Germany or of r e a l property i n 
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Germany), the remission i s understood to refer exclusively to 
German Substantive law, and not to the German c o n f l i c t 
30 
ru l e s . In order to avoid an international ping-pong match 
between the c o n f l i c t Systems, German Substantive law w i l l be 
the law of the succession, i f and i n so far as the national law 
31 
of the decedent refers back to German law. Since by way 
of renvoi the German p r i n c i p l e of unity-of-succession may be 
abandoned, arguments have been advanced i n favor of a 
double-renvoi, (reference back by the country to which the 
32 
o r i g i n a l reference was made) back to the national law, but 
so far with l i t t l e success. 
The doctrine of renvoi i n German law causes problems of 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n . While i n general l e g a l questions are to be 
33 
c l a s s i f i e d according to the German lex f o r i , questions 
a r i s i n g i n the context of the foreign law w i l l be c l a s s i f i e d 
34 
i n accordance with the law of lex causae. In applying the 
c o n f l i c t s law i n a given American State, German courts w i l l , 
for instance, look to the domicile concept of the law of that 
State. However, th i s i s not true with regard to the question 
whether certain property i s movable or immovable. The laws 
of the American states seem to reter t h i s question of c l a s s i -
35 
f i c a t i o n to the lex Situs, so that German courts, regret-
tably, have to draw a d i s t i n c t i o n which i s unknown i n German 
private international law. If the property i n question i s 
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36 37 land, the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s easy; not so where mortgages 
38 
or Company shares are concerned, or even i n s t i t u t i o n s of 
German law which are unknown to Americans, l i k e a spouse's 
r i g h t upon the d i s s o l u t i o n of the marriage to a share of the 
savings effected by the other during the marriage ("Zugewinn-
39 
ausgleich", § 1371 BGB). German courts are muddling 
through by applying i n t e r n a l dogmatic concepts of C l a s s i f i -
cation which appear scarcely suitable for international pur-
poses. The only assistance to the courts i s the guide-line 
of the Federal Supreme Court stating that, i n order to pre-
serve the endangered unity-of-succession, property r i g h t s 
40 
should be c l a s s i f i e d as movable as often as possible. A 
more functional approach to the problem of C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
41 
has been suggested, but has not yet been adopted by the 
courts. The consequence of a p a r t i a l renvoi with regard to immovables 
situated i n Germany i s the e f f e c t i v e S p l i t t i n g of the estate 
into two separate parts, one governed by the law of an 
American State, the other by German law as the lex s i t u s . 
Each part of the estate i s treated (by the German courts) as 
42 
a separate u n i t . Thus, creditors of the estate cannot be 
foreclosed by a f i n a l probate decree rendered i n the domicil-
iary State with regard to the immovable estate i n Germany; 43 they must observe the f o r m a l i t i e s prescribed by German law. 
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And a w i l l which i s i n v a l i d under the law of the domiciliary 
State of the American decedent, but v a l i d according to 
German law, can be upheld with regard to German immoy-
ables. 
c. Summary 
With respect to American-German relations the general 
Position of German private international law of succession 
45 
may be summarized as follows: 
(1) The personal property of an American decedent i s governed 
by the law of his l a s t domicile, which i s determined accord-
ing to the American domiciliary concept, 
His immovable property i s governed by the lex si t u s ; German 
law by way of renvoi determines whether the property i s 
immovable. 
As an exception, i f the American decedent was domiciled at 
the time of his death i n Germany according to German but not 
American law, the inheritance rights of German claimants to 
the estate w i l l be determined according to German law (art. 
25 sent. 2 EGBGB). 
(2) The estate of a German decedent i s governed by German 
law. However, the courts have to apply the American law of 
the situs to immovable property situated i n the U.S. (Art. 
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28 EGBGB). 
2. Limits to the lex hereditates 
The government of the lex hereditatis does not extend to a l l 
questions which might aris e i n connection with the d i s t r i -
bution of a decedent 1s estate, 
a. Preliminary Questions i n General 
There i s no unanimous view i n Germany with regard to pre-
liminary questions such as marital Status or legitimacy. The 
p r e v a i l i n g practice determines such questions independently 
of the lex causae according to general German c o n f l i c t s 
46 
rules, This method, which seems to be followed by most of 
the U.S. courts also, guarantees the harmony of decisions on 
the national l e v e l at the expense of international harmony. 
47 
The opponents of t h i s practice argue, not without reason, 
that where German c o n f l i c t rules refer to a foreign law, t h i s 
law should be applied as a whole i n the same way as would the 
foreign courts thereby assuring international uniformity of 
decisions. The determination of preliminary questions 
according to the lex causae f a i l s , however, where i n t e r -
national uniformity has been disregarded at an e a r l i e r stage: 
for example, the marriage between a Greek and a German, con-
cluded i n Germany before the r e g i s t r a r as prescribed by 
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German law (art, 13 EGBGB), w i l l be held v a l i d i n Germany, 
but i n v a l i d i n Greece, where sole l y the r e l i g i o u s form of 
marriage i s recognized. It becomes a so-called "limping" 
marriage. Upon the death of the Greek, the spouse and the 
children w i l l get nothing, i f the question of Status i s 
answered i n conformity with Greek law which i s here the lex 
he r e d i t a t i s . This w i l l not be accepted i n Germany; the 
marriage i s held v a l i d under German law, and, thereby, the 
limping marriage continues i n the form of a "limping" suc-
48 
cession. 
The n a t i o n a l i t y of the decedent i s a preliminary question, 
as well, but there i s no doubt that i t must be determined 
4 
according to the n a t i o n a l i t y law of each respective country. 
b. Assets belong to the Estate 
Preliminary to the actual application of any law of succes-
sion the question must, of course, be asked: Which assets are 
part of the estate? In general, the estate consists of 
assets i n which the decedent had a legal i n t e r e s t and the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of which i s not determined by special rules, 
i . e . , rules other than rules of succession, Generally, the 
50 
lex h e r e d i t a t i s decides what assets are part of the estate, 
but t h i s statement i s misleading. The law of succession 
governs only those assets which are " l e f t " i n the estate by 
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the international law of contracts, property, marital prop-
51 
erty, or partnerships. We w i l l examine four major problems 
in t h i s context. 
(1) Shares i n partnership, t r u s t , e t c . 
The treatment of shares i n companies, which are not con-
52 
sidered a separate legal e n t i t y , upon the death of the 
owner i s rather c l e a r . The c o n f l i c t rules on succession have 
to be reconciled with the special c o n f l i c t rules on companies. 
Under German private international law such associations are 
subject to the law of that country where the Company has i t s 
53 
actual seat of administration. A renvoi by that law w i l l 
54 
be accepted. Whether or not there are special provisions 
i n the charter of the Company, i t can be stated as a general 
guide-line: The law governing the partnership determines 
what assets w i l l go to the heirs. I t also determines the 
kind of procedure by which these assets w i l l be separated 
from the common assets of the partners. But i t i s up to the 
lex h e r e d i t a t i s to determine the heirs or be n e f i c i a r i e s who 
w i l l succeed to the assets d i s t r i b u t e d by the law of the 
p a r t n e r s h i p . ^ 
(2) Joint tenancies 
American Joint tenancies with the r i g h t of survivorship 
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deserve some special comment. In American law, the acqui-
s i t i o n of the t i t l e by the surviving tenant i s considered 
an intervivos transfer; the decedent 1s share does not f a l l 
5 6 
into his estate. There i s no equivalent to th i s i n German 
law, which knows d i f f e r e n t forms of co-ownership but no 
right of survivorship. 
If Americans have formed a Joint tenancy with regard to re a l 
property situated i n Germany, the devolution of t h i s prop-
erty upon the death of one of them w i l l be determined by 
German law as the lex h e r e d i t a t i s , either because of the 
renvoi of the American law, or by vi r t u e of the German con-
f l i c t s rule for r e a l property c a l l i n g for application of the 
57 
lex s i t u s . Since there i s not a r i g h t of survivorship 
under German law, the decedent's share i n the property f a l l s 
into his estate thus becoming subject to the rules of the 
lex h e r e d i t a t i s . ^ 
If the Joint tenancy has movables as i t s object (usually 
bank accounts) the law of the succession and the law of the 
property may not be i d e n t i c a l : Americans domiciled i n 
Michigan create a Joint bank-account i n Munich. The succes-
sion i s governed by Michigan law, but the contract with the 
59 
bank f a l l s under German law as the law of the bank's seat. 
6 0 
German courts w i l l prefer the law of the contract and 
thereby hold the Joint tenancy i n v a l i d . If the converse 
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Situation (Germans create a Joint tenancy with regard to a 
New York bank account) t h i s rule leads to New York law. 
Accordingly, the courts w i l l recognize the ri g h t of sur-
vivorship; the account i s not part of the decedent fs 
estate.6"** 
3. Donatio mortis causa 
The c l a s s i c a l device to escape rules of succession i s the 
donatio mortis causa, the problem of which i s well i l l u s -
trated by the reported " w i l l " of a decedent: "And so, being 
of sound mind and underStanding, I gave away every damn penny 
I had before I d i e d . " 6 2 
What has been given away v a l i d l y by the decedent as he or 
she l i v e d can no longer bestowed upon heirs or b e n e f i c i a r i e s . 
Usually, the laws of the American States recognize the 
donatio mortis causa as a property transfer inter-vivos, the 
6 3 
v a l i d i t y of which i s not governed by the law of succession. 
In Germany, the views are divided. A choice has to be made 
in order to ascertain the pertinent System of law, between 
(1) the law of the succession, (2) the law governing g i f t s 
inter-vivos and - insofar as bank accounts are concerned -
(3) the law governing the contract with the bank. If the 
transaction i s c l a s s i f i e d as an inter-vivos transfer, German 
courts w i l l apply the law which i s generally governs 
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64 donations, i . e . , the domicile of the donor or his national 
l a w / 5 except, as I have already mentioned, where the g i f t i s 
a bank account, i n which case the courts prefer the law of 
6 6 
the contract, which i s the law of the bank fs seat. If 
the donation i s c l a s s i f i e d as having been made mortis causa 
the pre v a i l i n g view holds that questions as to i t s v a l i d i t y 
and e f f e c t must be decided i n accordance with the lex 
her e d i t a t i s , i . e . , the national law of the donor at the time 
6 7 
of his death; since the donation i s to take e f f e c t upon the 
death of the donor, the same law should govern the succes-
sion and transactions which were intended s o l e l y to circum-
6 8 
vent the Substantive rules of succession. Some writers, 
on the other hand, argue i n favor of the national law of the 
69 
donor at the time the g i f t was delivered, at least insofar 
70 
as the v a l i d i t y of the donation i s concerned. 
It appears, therefore, that i t i s of c r u c i a l importance to 
determine how the transfer of a g i f t i s to be c l a s s i f i e d : as 
inter-vivos or mortis causa. This C l a s s i f i c a t i o n w i l l be 
71 
made i n congruence with the German lex f o r i , although i t 
would be more consistent to have t h i s question, too, decided 
72 
by the lex h e r e d i t a t i s . 
4. Marital property 
Just as there i s a provision i n German law to determine the 
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lex h e r e d i t a t i s , there i s a provision that determines which 
System of law should govern a l l questions of marital prop-
erty. According to a r t . 15 EGBGB and the case law, t h i s i s 
the national law of the husband at the time of the con-
73 
clusion of the marriage. This law i s c a l l e d the "law of 
the marital property". 
The law governing the marital property w i l l not be affected 
by a subsequent change of n a t i o n a l i t y ; i t i s immutable. 
Therefore where t h i s concept i s applied, i t may come to pass, 
that the succession, on the one hand, and the marital 
property, on the other, are not governed by the rules of one 
Single l e g a l System, but of two. Taking together the two 
fa c t s , that (1) the domestic rules on succession and marital 
property are designed to complement one another and (2) that 
the rules d i f f e r so greatly from country to country, we can 
see that the stage i s set for one of the most d i f f i c u l t 
74 
Problems i n German c o n f l i c t s law. The dualism of the law 
of marital property and succession i s well known i n the U.S. 
as well, a r i s i n g out of the Community property System i n 
several states. 
(a) As a general p r i n c i p l e , the law of the marital 
property determines what assets are not part of the 
estate, but subject to the regime of marital property 
rules for the death of one spouse. Only those assets, 
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which are not d i s t r i b u t e d by the marital property rules 
of t h i s law, are part of the decedent fs estate. 
The law of the succession determines how that which i s 
75 
l e f t must be d i s t r i b u t e d . 
(b) More d i f f i c u l t i s the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Statutes 
which reserve parts of the decedent fs property for his 
surviving spouse. Is a given Statute concerned with 
the d i s s o l u t i o n of the marital property regime or with 
inheritance Claims of the surviving spouse? This 
problem of C l a s s i f i c a t i o n , which has to be solved 
7 6 
according to the German lex f o r i , arises with regard 
to German as well as to whatever foreign Substantive 
law might be applicable under German c o n f l i c t s rules. 
As an example we s h a l l consider § 1371 BGB and §§ 201 
and 201.5, C a l i f o r n i a Probate Code. 
Under German law, the surviving spouse i s doubly 
bestowed; he takes one part as marital property (§1371 
BGB) and the other part by way of succession (§1931 
BGB). The most disputed § 1371 I BGB 7 7 i s r i g h t on the 
border l i n e of the two areas of law. In case of an 
intestacy, instead of the surviving spouse receiving an 
adjustment claim amounting to one-half of the savings 
effected by both partners i n the course of t h e i r 
marriage, the surviving spouse i s e n t i t l e d to an aug-
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mentation of t h i s inheritance claim by one-quarter of 
the estate. Some c l a s s i f y t h i s statutory portion of 
§ 1371 I BGB as a r e a l part of the marital property, 
7 8 
others see i t as an inheritance r i g h t . 
The view which seems to prevail,however, holds § 1371 I 
applicable only i f German law governs both marital 
79 
property and succession since elements of both marital 
property and succession are inextr i c a b l y interwoven in 
th i s provision. This means for German courts that 
§ 1371 I BGB cannot be applied i f the marital property 
i s governed by German law, but the applicable succes-
sion law i s foreign. In t h i s case, the share of the 
surviving spouse under foreign succession law w i l l not 
be automatically augmented. But i f the deceased spouse 
has i n fact made a surplus (excess over amount of 
property he owned at beginning of marriage) during the 
marriage, the survivor w i l l be compensated by award of 
one-half of such gains under German marital property 
law (§§ 1373 seqq. BGB). 8 0 The upshot of t h i s i s that 
American courts may ignore § 1371 I BGB unless German 
law i s applicable to both marital property and succes-
sion. This might happen i f r e a l property of persons 
domiciled i n the U.S. i s situated i n Germany since 
American c o n f l i c t rules prefer the lex situs regardless 
81 
of the marital property or succession context. 
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As another example, several German courts have had to 
p 2 
deal with §§ 201 and 201.5, C a l i f o r n i a Probate Code. 
According to § 201, the surviving spouse takes one-half 
of the Community property forthwith; the other half i s 
subject to the testamentary d i s p o s i t i o n of the decedent 
but i n the absence thereof the other half goes to the 
surviving spouse. § 201.5 extends t h i s rule to property 
acquired during marriage but while spouses were not yet 
subject to C a l i f o r n i a law. The treatment of these pro-
8 3 
v i s i o n s by American law w i l l not be automatically 
adopted by German courts. In applying German law they 
have to consider, however, the System and context of 
84 
the C a l i f o r n i a Probate Code. The f i r s t half of the 
Community property which goes d i r e c t l y to the surviving 
spouse under § 201 i s c l e a r l y part of the marital prop-
erty regime. The ac q u i s i t i o n of the f i r s t half under 
8 5 
§ 201.5 and of the second half under both provisions 
by the surviving spouse, where there i s no testament to 
the contrary, has been c l a s s i f i e d as a marital property 
8 6 
r u l e , too but the p r e v a i l i n g view c o r r e c t l y considers 
8 7 
i t a matter of succession. 
Let me summarize the position of German law with the 
ai d of two hypothetical cases: 
An American husband who had married his wife i n Germany 
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at a time when he was domiciled here dies intestate with 
his l a s t domicile i n C a l i f o r n i a . His estate consists 
of a bank account i n Munich, the value of which i s 
$100,000. The money was acquired while he was s t i l l 
domiciled i n German. $80,000 would have been, under 
C a l i f o r n i a law, quasi-community property of the spouses. 
How would a German court decide? The law of the marital 
property w i l l be German law (Art. 15 EGBGB plus renvoi, 
Art. 27 EGBGB). 
8 8 
The law of the succession w i l l be that of C a l i f o r n i a . 
As a preliminary question, therefore, the marital prop-
erty issue has to be solved. Art. 1371 I BGB cannot be 
8 9 
applied since the law of succession i s not German. 
But the widow may have an adjustment Claim against the 
heirs (§§1373 et seq. BGB) i f the husband has effected 
savings during the marriage. The whole bank account, 
however, i s part of the decedent 1s estate which w i l l 
be d i s t r i b u t e d according to C a l i f o r n i a law. § 201.5, 
C a l i f o r n i a Probate Code, as a rule of succession gives 
both halves of the "quasi" Community property to the 
surviving spouse. The remaining $20,000 i s "quasi" 
separate property and i s d i s t r i b u t e d i n accordance with 
§ 221, C a l i f o r n i a Probate Code. 
The converse l e g a l Situation may be i l l u s t r a t e d by the 
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following case: An American domiciled i n C a l i f o r n i a 
married a German. He dies with his l a s t domicile i n 
Germany. The bank account i n Munich remains the same. 
The money i n such account was acquired i n C a l i f o r n i a 
but thereafter was transferred to the Munich account. 
The law of*the marital property i s C a l i f o r n i a n law 
(Art. 15 EGBGB). The succession, on the other hand, i s 
governed by German law by v i r t u e of the renvoi i n the 
C a l i f o r n i a law (Art. 24, 25, 27 EGBGB). The widow w i l l 
take one half of the Community property under § 201, 
C a l i f o r n i a Probate Code r i g h t away, that i s $40,000. 
The remaining $60,000 are part of the estate. 
German law as the law of the succession w i l l give the 
widow a share under § 1931 BGB. The size of the share 
i s dependent upon the existence of descendants or other 
r e l a t i v e s e n t i t l e d to a share i n the estate. I t should 
be noted, however, that the share i s a share of the 
entire remaining estate, without any d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
between separate or Community property, which i s 
unknown to German law. As i n the foregoing example, 
the share w i l l not be augmented by application of 
§ 1371 I BGB which i s applicable only i f German law 
governs both marital property and succession. 
(c) One of the largest controversies i n the f i e l d of 
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marital property and succession centers on the f a c t 
that d i f f e r e n t c o n f l i c t rules may lead to d i f f e r e n t 
Substantive laws. Thereby, the close connection 
between the Substantive rules i n both f i e l d s i s des-
troyed and the r e s u l t may be i n t o l e r a b l e . The laws of 
some countries l e t the surviving spouse take a portion 
of the marital property, but do not provide f o r him or 
her i n the law of succession. The laws of others 
furnish the surviving spouse with a share of the estate, 
but withhold from him or her Claims upon the marital 
property a f t e r the termination of the marriage. In 
extreme cases, the combination of two l e g a l Systems can 
lead to great i n j u s t i c e j either the surviving spouse 
gets nothing, though he or she would have taken a share 
under each of the i n t e r n a l laws, or he gets much more 
90 
than provided for by either law. German law does not 
accept such r e s u l t s ; a Solution has to be found by way 
of adaption (adjustment). The proposals for a remedy 
of t h i s Situation are numerous, they cannot be expounded 
here i n d e t a i l . A l l I can o f f e r i s a b r i e f survey. 
Two basic approaches can be distinguished. Since the 
problem l i e s i n the area of private i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, 
i t i s argued, the Solution should be provided by t h i s 
law. The other approach prefers to change the a p p l i -
cable Substantive laws i n order to reach some balance. 
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In p a r t i c u l a r : On the l e v e l of private international 
law, the whole issue may be l e f t to one of the con-
f l i c t i n g Systems, be i t the law of the succession or 
91 
that of the marital property. An ingenious device 
was found by the Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht. 
9 2 
In that case a C i t i z e n of Lithuania had emigrated(1949) 
to C a l i f o r n i a , had married there i n 1960 and died some 
years l a t e r . At the time of his death he was a 
naturalized U.S. C i t i z e n ; his n a t i o n a l i t y at the time of 
his marriage was not clea r . The court simply declared 
the law of the marital property to be mutable (law 
a f f e c t i n g such property becomes the law of the new 
na t i o n a l i t y ) for the purposes of t h i s case and thereby 
came to the application of C a l i f o r n i a law which by 
v i r t u e of § 201.5, C a l i f o r n i a Probate Code, was ef f e c -
t i v e r e t r o a c t i v e l y from the time of the conclusion of 
marriage. Thus, the law of the succession and of the 
ma r i t a l property were i d e n t i c a l . Unfortunately, t h i s 
Solution works only i n the exceptional case where the 
new law of the marital propery (here: Cali f o r n i a ) i s 
93 
given retroactive e f f e c t . 
In respect to Substantive law, some writers would l i k e 
to see the Substantive rules of marital property of the 
lex h e r e d i t a t i s incorporated into i t s rules of succes-
94 
sion. Others would prefer the converse Solution, 
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i . e . , the incorporation of the succession rules of the 
law which governs the marital property into the rules 
95 
of marital property. F i n a l l y , i t has been proposed 
that both Substantive laws be applied cumulatively. 
The surviving spouse takes not more than each of the 
laws would grant him altogether (maximum l i m i t ) , but in 
any case that portion which he would take under both 
9 6 
laws respectively (minimum l i m i t ) . 
There i s no p r e v a i l i n g view on how to accomplish s a t i s -
fying r e s u l t s . As a summary i t may be said that some 
adaptive device w i l l be found i n any future case i n 
order to achieve a just d i s t r i b u t i o n of the estate. The 
rest depends on the inventiveness of the judge. 
B. INTESTATE SUCCESSION 
I. Issues Governed by the Lex Hereditatis 
The lex hereditatis determines a l l main questions of 
inheritance: the person who w i l l succeed to the estate i n 
the absence of a w i l l , capacity to receive as heir, the 
97 
acq u i s i t i o n of t i t l e to the estate, and the procedure to 
renounce i t . Since the u n i l a t e r a l disclaimer i s unknown with 
respect to intestate succession i n most of the American 
states, the disclaimer of a German has to be construed as to 
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i t s e f f e c t i f American law governs the succession. Accord-
ing to one view the disclaimer has the same e f f e c t as under 
9 8 
German law. Others consider i t a contractual transfer of 
99 
a p o s i t i o n acquired by succession. The correct Solution 
w i l l depend on whether an administration of the estate takes 
place i n the U.S. or not."*"00 If not, the beneficiary cannot 
dis c l a i m his po s i t i o n but may only transfer i t contract-
u a l l y . 
The law of succession governs the l e g a l r e l ations 
102 
between the b e n e f i c i a r i e s , t h e i r l i a b i l i t y for debts of 
103 
the decedent or of the estate, and contracts between the 
benef i c i a r i e s regarding the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the assets."'" 0 4 
F i n a l l y , the law of the succession governs the administration 
105 
of the estate. The question which law i n p a r t i c u l a r i s 
the lex her e d i t a t i s i n German-American succession cases with 
106 
regard to administration w i l l be discussed separately. 
I I . Inheritance Rights of I l l e g i t i m a t e children Under 
German Law 
Inheritance Claims of i l l e g i t i m a t e children d i f f e r from 
those of legitimate decendants under German law. This has 
some consequences foir the c o n f l i c t of laws. While the 
ordinary Claim of the i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d against the estate 
(§ 1934 a BGB) i s c l e a r l y subject to the law of succession, 
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the provisions of § 1934 d and e BGB, which give the i l l e -
gitimate c h i l d a Claim against the father during his l i f e -
time, are not e a s i l y c l a s s i f i e d . Some consider i t a matter 
of maintenance, because the portion paid out to the i l l e g i t i -
mate c h i l d i s calculated according to alimony Standards and 
107 
replaces the inheritance rights of the c h i l d . Conse-
quently, the applicable law would be the national law of the 
mother at the time of the chi l d ' s b i r t h (Art. 21 EGBGB) or 
108 
the law of the child's habitual residence. Others would 
rather apply the national law of the father as the law which 
governs the rela t i o n s between father and i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d 
109 
in general. The majority, however, seems to prefer the 
1 4 = . 1 1 0 
law of succession. 
Let us suppose that a German father pays out the portion 
required by § 1934 d BGB to his i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d during 
his l i f e t i m e , subsequently emigrates to a State i n the U.S. 
the law of which gives legitimate and i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n 
equal shares i n the estate of t h e i r father, and then dies 
with American c i t i z e n s h i p , domciled i n that State. There 
are three p o s s i b i l i t i e s : 
1. The i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d acquires upon the death of his 
father no share of the estate (the e f f e c t of §1934 e 
BGB i s extended to foreign succession law); 
2. In order to receive the statutory share the c h i l d has 
to pay back the portion already received; 
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3. The c h i l d keeps the portion already received and takes 
i n addition his statutory share under American law. 
As one might expect, views are divided on th i s i s s u e , 1 1 1 
112 
and j u d i c i a l guide-lines are s t i l l missing. 
I I I . RULES OF ESCHEAT 
Whether an escheat of the estate s h a l l take place i s 
113 
determined by the law of succession. The c r u c i a l question 
i s only which State should take the estate. Under German 
113 
law i t w i l l be the State whose law governs the succession. 
The enforcement of t h i s p o s i t i o n , where German law governs 
114 
assets situated abroad, depends on the lex s i t u s . 
C. W i l l s and Contracts of Inheritance 
I. Choice of Law by the Testator 
Choice of law clauses i n w i l l s , which may be concluded 
and which are recognized i n some states of the U.S. do not 
bind a German court by i t s choice of the applicable law. 
The arguments i n favor of party autonomy (choice of law by 
the parties) i n the f i e l d of succession l a w 1 1 5 have been 
rejected by the Federal Supreme Court and the majority of 
116 
scholars, so that at least on t h i s issue the law i s 
s e t t l e d . The reference of the testator to a ce r t a i n law 
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may be used, however, as an aid i n the construction of the 
•n 1 1 7 w i l l . 
The Standpoint of foreign private international law v i s - a - v i s 
party autonomy must be examined with reference to the 
118 
problem of the renvoi. An example: An American decedent 
who was a Michigan C i t i z e n by o r i g i n but who l a t e r acquired 
a domicile of choice i n Germany made a w i l l declaring the 
law of Michigan applicable for the di s p o s i t i o n of his per-
sonal property. A German court w i l l disregard the choice of 
law clause within the framework of German c o n f l i c t s law and 
follow the reference of Art. 24, 25 EGBGB to the national law 
of the decedent i n t h i s case, Michigan law. That law which 
as a matter of p r i n c i p l e would refer back to German law 
being the law of the testator's domicile, recognizes the 
said choice of law clause (§ 702.44 a Michigan Probate Code). 
Consequently, the German court has to respect the choice of 
law clause within the framework of Michigan c o n f l i c t s law 
and thereby apply Michigan law as the law of the succession 
with regard to the movables. 
I I . The Formal V a l i d i t y of Wi l l s 
The formal v a l i d i t y of w i l l s i s governed by a va r i e t y 
119 
of laws i n accordance with the Hague Convention of 1961, 
which replaces Art. 11 EGBGB. The poli c y of the Convention 
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i s to validate w i l l s as far as possible. I t applies with 
regard to American decedents as w e l l f although the U.S. i s 
not a party to the Convention (Art. 6, sent. 2 of the Con-
vention) . Not only w i l l s , but also the formal v a l i d i t y of 
the revocation of a w i l l by testament are determined by the 
121 
rules of the Convention. 
I I I . The Essential V a l i d i t y and Effec t s of a W i l l 
1. The Applicable Law i n General 
The lex hereditatis (supra A. II) determines the v a l i d i t y 
and e f f e c t of w i l l s , too. The w i l l , however, may have 
been drawn up many years before the death of the tes-
tator. A change i n n a t i o n a l i t y may have brought about 
a change of the relevant lex her e d i t a t i s i n the mean-
time. In order to protect the expectations of the 
testator at the time of the making of the w i l l , i t i s 
proposed that the law which would have governed the 
succession at that time^determine the v a l i d i t y of the 
w i l l , leaving only the e f f e c t of the w i l l to be 
determined by the law of succession at the time of 
122 
death. The pr e v a i l i n g view, on the other hand, con-
siders the l a t t e r law applicable to both v a l i d i t y and 
e f f e c t s . 1 2 3 Jt i s to be noted that Art 24 I I I . EGBGB 124 makes an exception with regard to the capacity to w i l l . 
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2. Issues Governed by the Lex Hereditatis 
In p a r t i c u l a r , the law of succession w i l l determine 
matters r e l a t i n g to the forced shares of surviving 
125 
spouse and r e l a t i v e s , the ri g h t of a test a t o r to 
126 
d i s i n h e r i t family members, the v a l i d i t y and e f f e c t 
127 
of conditional or l i f e estates, the nomination of 
128 129 executors, and the revocation of w i l l s . 
a. Construction 
A few comments are necessary concerning the con-
struction of w i l l s . Generally, the w i l l i s to be con-
130 
strued according to the law of succession, even i f 
the testator had another law i n mind when making the 
w i l l . Thus, "American" w i l l s have to be construed 
according to German rules of construction i f German law 
governs the succession. But as under German law the 
"presumable intent" of the testator serves as a leading 
guideline for construction, some concepts of American 
131 
law can be expected to s l i p i n through the back-door, 
so to speak. But they w i l l have to be adapted and 
"translated" into the concepts and i n s t i t u t i o n s of 
German law. 
b. "American" Wil l s i n German Law 
(1) The C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Ben e f i c i a r i e s 
Under German law, an heir i s any person who takes 
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the whole estate or an undivided f r a c t i o n thereof. 
A person who takes only s p e c i f i c a l l y designated 
assets of items of property does not qu a l i f y as 
heir. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s important i n German law 
for purposes of taxation or a c e r t i f i c a t e of 
inheritance. 
Accordingly, s p e c i f i c or general legacies i n 
"American" testaments do not make the beneficiary 
an heir under German law. But the residuary 
legatees are considered heirs regardless of 
whether or not an administrator f i r s t has pos-
132 
session of or t i t l e to the estate. Bene-
f i c i a r i e s of an estate upon absolute l i m i t a t i o n 
( l i k e l i f e estates) w i l l be considered pro-
v i s i o n a l heirs, the remainderman reversionary 
133 
h e i r s . Estates upon conditional l i m i t a t i o n can 
be upheld nearly unchanged. Since these kinds of 
legacies are not common i n German w i l l s , the 
greatest d i f f i c u l t i e s l i e i n the exact formulation 
134 
of the c e r t i f i c a t e of inheritance. 
(2) Trusts 
The concept of a tr u s t i s unknown to German law. 
The t r u s t i s not, however, repugnant to German law 
135 being the lex situs and therefore w i l l be con-
136 
sidered v a l i d , A problem of transposition 
arises as to the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the persons 
affected by the t r u s t . The trustee who i s not a 
beneficiary at the same time does not q u a l i f y as 
an heir, but rather as an executor under § 2209 
137 
BGB. His powers extend to property situated i n 
138 
Germany, as well. The b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the 
t r u s t may q u a l i f y as heirs, provisional or rever-
sionary heirs or as creditors of the estate, as 
139 
the case may be. The same applies to the 
140 
trustee who i s beneficiary at the same time. 
These rules must be modified with regard to c h a r i -
table or discretionary trusts on a case by case . . 141 basis. 
(3) Powers of Appointment 
With regard to powers of appointment created by a 
w i l l , German and American c o n f l i c t rules agree i n 
applying the law of succession to determine i t s es-
142 
s e n t i a l v a l i d i t y and e f f e c t s . If the lex here-
d i t a t i s i s German law, problems of transposition 
a r i s e out of the f a c t that the German law i n general 
does not admit such powers (§2065 BGB). This w i l l not 
be the case, however, i f the power i s l i m i t e d to 
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s p e c i f i e d items of property - i n t h i s respect there 
14 3 
i s a comparable I n s t i t u t i o n i n German law. But 
i f the donee i s empowered to dispose of the e n t i r e 
estate or an undivided f r a c t i o n of i t , i . e . , to 
appoint legatees who are to be c l a s s i f i e d as heirs 
under German law, the Situation becomes complicated. 
The I n s t i t u t i o n of provisionary or reversionary 
heirship can be applied i f the donee i s the bene-
f i c i a r y of a l i f e estate at the same time and has 
a testamentary power to appoint the remainderman, 
but i n default of such appointment a remainderman 
144 
i s designated by the donor-testator. If the 
donee has a general power of appointment exer-
cisable inter vivos he w i l l be considered to be an 
145 
heir. If the power i s exercisable by testament 
only, the general power cannot be upheld under 
German law. 
In case of a special power, i t s v a l i d i t y w i l l 
depend on the question whether the possible 
appointees are few and the f i n a l choice i s mostly 
predetermined by the testator, leaving the donee 
147 
l i t t l e or no d i s c r e t i o n . 
IV Joint and Mutual W i l l s 
In general, the lex hereditatis governs Joint and mutual 
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w i l l s as well. But t h i s Statement means l i t t l e unless i t i s 
spe c i f i e d as to certain points. 
1. Cumulation of the National Laws 
If the national laws of the testators d i f f e r , both laws 
have to be applied, each with regard to the d i s p o s i t i o n of 
148 
one part. Should the r e s u l t be that one of the testators 
i s not bound, the rec i p r o c a l dispositions of the other w i l l 
149 
lose i t s binding e f f e c t s , too. Under German Substantive 
law there i s a presumption that the testator would not have 
made the w i l l at a l l i n t h i s case, so that the d i s p o s i t i o n 
i s i n v a l i d altogether (§ 2270 BGB). 
2. Formal V a l i d i t y 
Two questions must be kept d i s t i n c t from one another: 
the question i s whether persons may w i l l j o i n t l y i n a Single 
document; the other question i s whether t h e i r dispositions 
are dependent on each other and preclude u n i l a t e r a l revo-
cations. The f i r s t question relates to the form of w i l l s , 
the l a t t e r to the e f f e c t of Joint and mutual di s p o s i t i o n s . 
The formal requirements are determined by the Hague Conven-
ti o n of 1961 (Art. 4). Thus, i f the national law of the 
testators forbids Joint w i l l s on formal grounds, the w i l l 
may nevertheless be v a l i d under the law of some other 
country c a l l e d for by the Convention, for example, the law 
of the place of making the w i l l . (Art. 1 a of the Con-
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vention). However, i t may be, as i n the case of I t a l y 
(Art. 589 Cc), that a country forbids mutual w i l l s for 
reasons of public p o l i c y . In this case, the Joint and 
mutual w i l l of a national of t h i s country i s void wherever 
made. 
3. Effec t s 
The German courts apply, as a rule, the national law of 
the testators at the time of d e a t h . 1 5 1 The pre v a i l i n g view 
in the le g a l l i t e r a t u r e , on the other hand, argues i n favor 
15 
of the national law at the time of the making of the w i l l . 
Neither theory can resolve a l l problems: If nationals of 
the Netherlands, the law of which forbid Joint w i l l s on 
formal grounds, make a Joint and mutual w i l l i n Germany, the 
w i l l i s formally v a l i d . Its e f f e c t has to be determined 
according to Dutch law being the national law of the tes-
tators. Understandably, Dutch law does not arrange for a 
binding e f f e c t . The r e s u l t for German courts w i l l be a non-
binding mutual w i l l - an I n s t i t u t i o n not known i n either of 
153 
the interested countrxes. 
4. German-American Relations 
a. U.S. Law Governing The Succession 
If German courts have to apply the law of an American 
estate, they look for a separate contract to make or 
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not to revoke a w i l l i n order to determine the binding 
154 
e f f e c t of Joint and mutual w i l l s . The argument that 
155 
such contracts v i o l a t e German public policy i s 
cor r e c t l y rejected by the majority of leg a l s c h o l a r s . 1 5 6 
In accordance with the pre v a i l i n g view i n the U.S., 
German courts w i l l not assume an implied contract 
merely because the testators have made a Joint and 
157 
mutual w i l l . 
If German spouses, who have made a mutual w i l l in 
Germany, become U.S. Citizens domiciled i n New York, 
and the surviving spouse revokes his previous dispo-
s i t i o n by a new w i l l , the remedies of the b e n e f i c i a r i e s 
under the mutual w i l l have to be determined according 
158 
to the law of New York. There seems to be no way to 
159 
secure the effe c t s of German law, as i t was proposed. 
b. German Law Governing The Succession 
An American couple makes a mutual w i l l i n New York, 
each marital partner leaving everything to the other 
and providing for the children to take the rest a f t e r 
the death of the survivor. After the death of the 
man, the wife married a German, acquires German 
na t i o n a l i t y and makes a w i l l exclusively i n favor of 
her new husband. How can the children enforce the 
rights under the mutual w i l l after the death of t h e i r 
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mother? Those who apply the national law of the 
decedent at the time of death have to apply German law 
which declares that the mutual w i l l i s binding and the 
second w i l l void (§ 2271 BGB). Those who apply the 
national law at the time of the making have to apply 
New York law to the mutual w i l l . Under New York law 
the v i o l a t i o n of a contract not to revoke the w i l l does 
not make the revoking w i l l i n v a l i d . Though i t would be 
consistent to decide t h i s case i n the same way as the 
foregoing (supra a), the court t r i e d to impose the 
ef f e c t of German law upon the mutual w i l l made i n 
New York. 
V. Inheritance Agreements and Release of Expectancy 
Inheritance agreements (Erbvertrage) are unknown to 
American law, but through the recognition and enforcement 
161 
of contracts to make w i l l s similar results are reached. 
The contractual release of expectancy has a counterpart i n 
German Law. 
1. Form 
The formal v a l i d i t y of both i n s t i t u t i o n s i s not pro-
vided by the Hague Convention of 1961, but by a r t i c l e 11 
EGBGB. Hence, the law of succession of the place of the 
making governs. If a release of expectancy i s contained i n 
an instrument signed by a notary public i n the U.S. and 
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German law governs the succession, the release does not 
16 2 
f u l f i l the formal requirements of German law. After 
ascertainment of the fact that the American and German 
i n s t i t u t i o n s are equivalent; the formal v a l i d i t y i s approved 
according to the law of the place where the release has 
been executed. 1 6 3 
2. Effects 
With regard to the eff e c t s there i s again a dispute 
whether the national law at the time of the decedent 1s 
death 1^ 4 or at the time of making^^should be applicable, 
The l a t t e r view seems to be the prev a i l i n g one today. How-
ever t h i s dispute may be set t l e d , the law of succession w i l l 
govern b i l a t e r a l contracts of inheritance only for that 
166 
contracting party who makes dispositions upon his death. 
Needless to say that i f the parties are of d i f f e r e n t nation-
167 
a l i t y the law of each w i l l apply to his own disp o s i t i o n s . 
There may be marriage and inheritance contracts which were 
made together i n one document. The applicable law i s deter-
mined by the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the pa r t i c u l a r provisions. 
I t may be the law of the marital property (Art. 15 EGBGB)f 
of the personal relations of the spouses (Art, 14 EGBGB) 
168 
or the law of succession. 
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D. PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 
F i n a l l y , problems of probate and administration arise 
in the context of international estate cases. F i r s t , we 
s h a l l consider the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l questions and the effects 
of American probate court decisions. The second and l a s t 
point w i l l be the administration of German-American estates. 
I Probate 
1. German Probate J u r i s d i c t i o n 
Contentious l i t i g a t i o n with regard to decedents 1 
estates poses no s p e c i f i c problems: international j u r i s -
169 
d i c t i o n i s derived from the venue requirements. But 
here we w i l l be concerned rather with the J u r i s d i c t i o n i n 
a l l estate-related matters which arise i n the course of a 
non-contentious proceeding. The question as to the J u r i s -
d i c t i o n of the courts i n th i s area i s hotly disputed and 
the law seems to be i n a State of flux today. 
a. P a r a l l e l i s m of J u r i s d i c t i o n and Applicable Law 
Americans are familiär with the p r i n c i p l e that a court 
with proper J u r i s d i c t i o n applies i t s own law. The 
t r a d i t i o n a l and s t i l l p r e v ailing view in Germany puts 
i t the other way around, declaring that German "Pro-
bate Courts" have J u r i s d i c t i o n i f and insofar as 
170 
German law governs the succession. They have 
admitted, however, some exceptions to th i s rule to assure 
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that a denial of J u r i s d i c t i o n does not lead to a 
denial of j u s t i c e . Thus, the J u r i s d i c t i o n of German 
courts was affirmed despite the fact that foreign law 
governed succession i n the following s i t u a t i o n s : an 
application to draw up an inventory of the assets of 
171 
the estate, the receiving of declarations of 
172 
acceptance or disclaimer by the heir, the openmg 
173 
of the w i l l a f t e r the testator's death, the 
appointment of a curator (custodian-Ed.) or other 
orders to secure and protect the estate where the heir 
174 
i s unknown. The J u r i s d i c t i o n of German courts i s 
given, moreover, ipso iure with regard to c e r t i f i c a t e s 
of inheritance and executorship (§§ 2368, 2369 BGB); 
they may be issued for assets i n Germany even i f 
governed by a foreign law of succession. 
b. Modern Tendencies 
It has been argued that i n the f i e l d of succession Sub-
stantive and procedural law i s not so c l o s e l y bound up 
. . . 175 with one another as the t r a d i t i o n a l view supposes. 
The j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n of the German courts to 
cases which are governed by German law i s said to be 
intolerable i n an age of such high international 
17 6 
mobility. From t h i s point of view J u r i s d i c t i o n i s 
given provided the case has some connection with 
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177 Germany. The discussion focuses rather on the 
178 
r e s t r i c t i o n s for exceptional cases. Though i t may be 
179 
said that the views are Coming closer to each other, 
they are s t i l l far from r e c o n c i l i a t i o n as can be shown 
with respect to the administration of estates. 
2. American Probate Court Decisions i n Germany 
Generally, an American domiciliary probate decree i s not 
necessary for the recognition of the v a l i d i t y of a w i l l . It 
may, however, raise a presumption of v a l i d i t y for American or 
180 
English w i l l s . On the other hand, the view that the 
period of l i m i t a t i o n for Claims against the estate under 
181 
German law i s dependent on a domiciliary probate decree, 
must be rejected. 
In a recent case, an American decedent with l a s t domicile i n 
New York l e f t personal property i n New York and Germany. A 
creditor f i l e d his claim against the estate with the admini-
strator i n New York. The administrator rejected the claim. 
This decision was, af t e r a t r i a l , affirmed by the New York 
Surrogate Court i n a f i n a l probate decree. Then, the 
cr e d i t o r sued again i n Germany with respect to the assets 
situated i n Germany. Is he foreclosed by the p r i n c i p l e of 
res judicata? A published expert opinion advised the court 
18 2 
as follows: F i r s t , the f i n a l probate decree i n domi-
c i l i a r y proceedings i s given universal e f f e c t under the law 
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of New York. Second, such decisions generally Warrant 
the application of the res-judicata doctrine within the 
184 
U.S. Th i r d f t h i s e f f e c t extends to Germany i f the 
r e c i p r o c i t y of recognition of j u d i c i a l decision i s guar-
anteed (§ 328 Z i f . 5 ZPO). After an exhaustive discussion 
of the court practice i n New York, the r e c i p r o c i t y was 
185 
ascertained. As a r e s u l t , the c r e d i t o r f s action was 
barred i n Germany by the decree of the New York Surrogate 
Court. 
I I . Administration 
In contrast to the American law the German law of 
decedents 1 estates does not, i n general, allow for an admini-
s t r a t i o n i n the Anglo-American sense. The German p r i n c i p l e 
i s self-administration by the heirs and s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n by 
the c r e d i t o r s . It i s not surprising, therefore, that 
American-German cases often cause d i f f i c u l t i e s e s p e c i a l l y i n 
the f i e l d of adminstration. 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s are not l i k e l y to be resolved by the adop-
ti o n of the new Hague Convention on the International Admini-
18 6 
s t r a t i o n of Decedents 1 Estates of 1973. This Convention 
seems to create more problems than there are already i n 
187 
existence. It has received harsh c r i t i c i s m and has l i t t l e 
chance of being adopted by a s i g n i f i c a n t number of countries. 
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Two basic groups of cases have to be distinguished for the 
discussion of administration problems: Those cases, where 
German law governs the succession, and those which are 
governed by the law of one of the states of the United States. 
1. German Law Governing the Succession 
a. Intestate Succession 
If the decedent has l e f t no w i l l , the legal Situation i s 
simple: No administration w i l l take place; an adminis-
t r a t i o n ordered i n an American State w i l l be ignored, 
and the heirs w i l l take their shares as heirs under 
German law usually do, as legal successors to the t i t l e 
of the decedent. 1 8^ 
b. Testmentary Succession 
The Situation i s d i f f e r e n t with regard to w i l l s only 
where the testator has made the w i l l according to 
American law and, as usual, has appointed an executor. 
It has to be remembered that German law knows the 
I n s t i t u t i o n of an executor, too. But the function of 
t h i s German executor i s the enforcement and f u l f i l l m e n t 
of s p e c i a l burdens imposed by the testator rather than 
190 
a regulär administration of the estate. Since many 
American testators appoint an executor only to avoid 
the appointment of an administrator c.t.a. by the court, 
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some scholars would l i k e to see the testamentary 
appointment under German law enforced only i f the 
testator's aim was to confer upon the administrator 
duties which exceed the regulär duties of an adminis-
191 
trator according to the Anglo-American conception. 
Other writers would enforce a testamentary appoint-
192 
ment i n any case. Insofar as the appointment of 
the executor i s affirmed i n Germany he has the position 
of an executor of the German style even i f he admini-
sters the estate from his home i n C a l i f o r n i a together 
with assets situated i n the U.S. and possibly governed 
by U.S. law. 
2. U.S. Law Governing Succession 
As has been shown, American succession law i s d i f f i c u l t 
to reconcile with German law. This i s true with regard to 
German procedure, too, which i s always applicable as the lex 
f o r i . 
Two approaches can be ascertained by which German lawyers 
try to cope with the d i f f i c u l t i e s of administration. One 
approach avoids foreign law by applying the lex f o r i to 
matters of administration, and the other approach resorts to 
adaption and similar devices. 
a. Administration Governed By The German Lex F o r i 
I have already mentioned the proposal of Ferid to 
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apply the lex f o r i to a l l matters of administration. 
Thus, the German c o n f l i c t rule would refer d i r e c t l y to 
German law i n t h i s respect. But th i s doctrine i s not 
yet accepted by others. The next best Solution from 
th i s point of view i s the application of the German lex 
f o r i by way of renvoi. In t h i s regard, German writers 
have discovered a hidden renvoi i n the law of the 
American states, which i s said to refer a l l questions 
of administration to the lex s i t u s , or what i s the same 
194 
in a l l but a few cases, to the lex f o r i . This theory 
i s based on the two facts that, i n the U.S., every State 
where assets of the estate are situated may order a 
separate administration, and secondly, that the a n c i l -
l a r y administration i s governed by the respective lex 
f o r i . As a r e s u l t , regardless of the law governing the 
succession, German Substantive law would determine the 
questions of administration i n American-German succession 
cases. 
This doctrine i s ingenious but does not r e f l e c t the r e a l 
attitude of the American law. American law i s con-
cerned with j u r i s d i c t i o n a l requirements and does not 
State separate rules for the applicable law. There i s 
no question that an administrator who i s appointed by a 
court i n a given State has to act according to the law 
of that State. Hence, the appointment of an executor 
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i s the j u s t i f y i n g f a c t for the application of the lex 
situs to matters of administration. There i s no 
reference to the lex situs independent of such an 
appointment. Since the German theory uses the alleged 
renvoi to the German lex f o r i for the very purpose of 
avoiding the appointment of an administrator, which i s 
not necessary under German law, i t abandons i t s own 
. . . 195 
star t i n g point and we have a vicious c i r c l e . 
Moreover, i f American succession law and German rules of 
administration have to be combined, the former has to 
. . . . 196 
undergo substantial modiflcations by adaption. But 
i t seems more appropriate to adapt German rules of 
procedure as far as possible to the foreign law of 
succession the application of which i s ordered by the 
German c o n f l i c t s rules rather than change the applicable 
Substantive law for reasons of procedural convenience. 
b. Administration Governed By American Law 
The p r e v a i l i n g view holds the American law to be 
applicable to administration. I t i s , however, disputed 
among German courts and l e g a l scholars how the American 
concept of the administration i s to be put into 
197 
practice i n Germany. 
One view sees no way of rec o n c i l i n g American law of 
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succession and German procedure. The transposition of 
American i n s t i t u t i o n s into comparable German i n s t i -
tutions i s possible only i n few instances. Conse-
quently, they deny the power of German courts to i n s t i -
tute an American-type administration. American adminis-
198 
trators/executors are not recognized. The so-called 
"doctrine of recognition", on the other hand, adopts 
American p r i n c i p l e s of administration and recognizes 
the powers of appointed executors and administrators, at 
least i f they have been appointed by the domiciliary 
199 
court of the decedent. Accordingly, the American 
administrator or executor i s e n t i t l e d to a c e r t i f i c a t e 
under German law which s p e l l s out his powers under the 
law of his State of appointment. 2 0 0 
The f i r s t opinion, that German procedure cannot be com-
bined with American Substantive law of succession, runs 
counter to the practice of German courts which follow 
the "doctrine of recognition". The second argument that 
the powers of administrators are limited under U.S. law 
to t h e i r respective states and therefore cannot be 
201 . . extended to Germany, i s not v a l i d for domiciliary 
202 
administrators. The domiciliary State i n the U.S. 
w i l l accept, however, the posi t i o n of other states 
which do not recognize or admit acts of the domicilary 
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administrator, but prefer to i n s t i t u t e an a n c i l l a r y 
203 
administration. This Situation between the various 
states cannot provide an argument by way of analogy 
against the recognition of American administrators i n 
Germany. F i r s t , the tendency even within the U.S. i s 
towards universal succession, i . e . , more and more 
states allow foreign administrators to sue and to be 
sued i n their courts and l e t the domiciliary adminis-
trator do the whole business with respect to a l l states 
204 
where the deceased owned property at death. Secondly, 
the reference of German c o n f l i c t rules to the American 
law i s unconditional, i t includes questions of adminis-
t r a t i o n , as well. There i s nothing i n the German law 
which prevents foreign heirs or administrators from 
bringing actions against the estate for assets i n 
205 
Germany. The c r e d i t o r s , f m a l l y , which are said to 
be placed i n a disadvantageous position through the 
recognition of American administrators, have to protect 
206 
themselves, as i n a l l other succession cases. 
The view, the so-called "doctrine of recognition", seems, 
indeed, to p r e v a i l i n Germany. 
II I . C e r t i f i c a t e s" of Inheritance 
The issuance of c e r t i f i c a t e s of inheritance i s one of 
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the main tasks of German courts i n succession cases. The 
c e r t i f i c a t e i s designed to legitimate the persons who have 
the t i t l e to the estate and may dispose of i t (§§ 2 3 5 3 - 2 3 7 0 
BGB). The c e r t i f i c a t e i s issued upon application of persons 
who have a lega l interest i n i t s issuance. In succession 
cases which are governed by U.S. law a great d i f f i c u l t y l i e s 
in the tr a n s l a t i o n of the lega l Situation i n German legal 
207 
language and concepts. This i s c e r t a i n l y not of great 
interest to Americans. I t may be generally noted that the 
distributees or residuary legates are considered "heirs" for 
purposes of the c e r t i f i c a t e ; but i t w i l l be added that the 
law of a p a r t i c u l a r State of the U.S. governs the succession 
and that the estate i s subject to administration under i 208 American law. 
German c e r t i f i c a t e s of inheritance do not represent a f i n a l 
adjudication and therefore are not conclusive for American 
courts, but they may provide prima f a c i e evidence for the 
correctness of a p a r t i c u l a r Interpretation of the German 
, 209 law. 
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